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COMMUNITY POLICING: BROKEN
WINDOWS, COMMUNITY
BUILDING, AND SATISFACTION
WITH THE POLICE
The concept of community policing dominates the law
enforcement profession today. One would be hard pressed to
find an advertisement for a police chief’s position that does not
require a thorough understanding of this method of policing.
Like the Kansas City preventive patrol experiment and the
Rand report on the criminal investigation process, the call for
community policing has led to dramatic changes in the way
that police carry out their responsibilities. In spite of its
popularity, there have been a number of challenges to com-
munity policing from social scientists who are particularly
concerned about the ‘broken windows’ model of policing.
These challenges have not been received well by the law
enforcement community, which argues that sociologists are
wedded to the idea that crime is caused by the structural
features of capitalist society, including economic injustice,
racism, and poverty. The purpose of this article is to bridge the
gap between these two positions. Yes, there is a place for
community policing, and, yes, social problems do contribute to
crime. The article starts by reviewing the development of
community policing in the United States. An analysis of the
theoretical constructs that support community policing then
follows. Finally, we argue that there is sound theoretical
evidence to support community policing, particularly those
programmes that improve citizen satisfaction with the manner
in which police carry out their responsibilities.
Community Policing
Community policing is a law enforcement philosophy based on
the concept that police officers and private citizens, working
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together in creative ways, can help solve contemporary commun-
ity problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical
disorder, and neighbourhood conditions (Tronjanowicz et al.,
1998). Police departments have attempted to institute community
policing in a number of ways including foot patrol, bicycle
patrol, police substations, citizen police academies, community
meetings, newsletters, surveys, crime analysis, and working with
other government agencies to find non-traditional solutions to
crime problems. How it looks in practice varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction in response to the individual needs of each
community. Community policing is said to have three core
elements: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentral-
isation (Skogan, 2006). All are related, but citizen involvement is
especially crucial because it is the basis of the theoretical
foundation of community policing.
The concept of community policing evolved over time.
Rising crime rates in the early 1960s led to a recognition that
changes needed to occur in the US police service. This concern
was highlighted by the President’s Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice (1967), which called
national attention to the need to improve the components of the
criminal justice system. The need for change may have come as
a surprise to many police officials. Progressive police admin-
istrators, throughout the nation, had been working diligently,
since the repeal of Prohibition, to modernise their police depart-
ments. The introduction of the principles of scientific manage-
ment and the professionalisation of the rank and file were seen as
the keys to successful police operations. Reviews of the manner
in which police handled Viet Nam war protestors and civil rights
demonstrators told a different story. Police handling of the 1968
democratic convention in Chicago was labelled a ‘police riot’ by
investigators from the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence because of the manner in which Chicago
Police responded to acts of civil disobedience by antiwar pro-
testors. The 1968 National Commission on Civil Disorders
(Kerner, 1968) concluded that the riots that had occurred in Los
Angeles (1965), Chicago (1966), Newark (1967), and Detroit
(1967) were not only the result of systematic discrimination,
but also poverty, unemployment, poor education, inadequate
housing, poor health care, and systematic police bias and bru-
tality! This finding, in particular, led to the recognition that
police departments were often isolated and alienated from an
important segment of their communities: those that needed their
services most.
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The isolation that police felt from the communities they
served has been attributed to the very reforms that have driven
police modernisation. The history of policing is generally
divided into three time periods: the political, the professional,
and the community policing eras (Kelling & Moore 1988).
During the political era (1840–1930), police agencies were
dominated by local political leaders, poorly organised, and
rampant with corruption. The professional era of policing
(1930–1970) sought to remedy these problems by removal of
the police from politics, the introduction of the principles of sci-
entific management, and the implementation of advanced
technology including the telephone and police radio. In addition,
police departments, throughout the United States, adopted O. W.
Wilson’s strategy of motorised patrol, rapid response to calls for
service, and retrospective investigation of crime. It was these
very reforms that sparked the community policing revolution.
Motorised patrol and the command-and-control function of the
police radio dispatcher came to be viewed as the direct causes of
the separation of the police from the community.
In response to the national call to improve policing, uni-
versity researchers and police officials began evaluating police
operations. Three of their studies had a profound effect on the
manner in which police carried out their responsibilities and
were particularly important to the evolution of community
policing. The first, the 1973 Kansas City Preventive Patrol
Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974), found that traditional routine
police patrol in marked vehicles did not affect the level of crime.
That same year, the Rand Corporation undertook a nationwide
study of detective practices in order to assess the value of
criminal investigations. The study concluded that detective work
played a minor role in contributing to overall arrest rates and that
much of a detective’s time was consumed with administrative
paperwork and interviewing witnesses in cases that had little
likelihood of being solved (Greenwood & Petersilia, 1975).
Finally, the Kansas City Response Time Study (1977) found that
faster police response time did not necessarily lead to more
arrests. This was due in large part to the fact that victims often
did not immediately report crime to the police.
Two other developments contributed directly to the evolution
of community policing. The first, team policing, assigned
responsibility for all police activity in a specific geographic area
to a permanent team of officers including the integration of
patrol and follow-up investigative activities (Sherman et al.,
1973). Team policing was seen as a way to address the problems
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of the over-centralisation of police agencies and the increasing
sense of alienation felt by the community. Begun in Aberdeen,
Scotland, team policing sought to hold a small group of officers
responsible for crime in their area of assignment. Although
received with great enthusiasm by the 1967 President’s Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
team policing never fulfilled its promise. One of the main
reasons for this was the practical limitations of the integration of
different areas of police specialisation, though, many police
departments have adopted the team policing requirement of
permanency of watch and geographic assignment.
Another advancement that contributed to the evolution of
community policing was the development of problem-oriented
policing. Claiming that they were so preoccupied with running
their organisations, Herman Goldstein (1979) argued that the
police had lost sight of their primary purpose of crime control.
Like a bus passing riders to keep on schedule, police depart-
ments were spending too much time on efforts to improve
internal management and not enough time on efforts to improve
crime control. To remedy the problem, Goldstein recommended
that police break down categories of crime and disorder into
discrete problems and develop specific responses to each one.
Problem-oriented policing was given a boost by the development
of ‘routine activities theory’. Published the same year as
Goldstein’s call for police problem solving, routine activities
theory argued that three things were necessary for crime to
occur: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of
a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Change one of these
conditions and the offence will not occur. Routine activities
theory provided law enforcement with the analytical means to
study crime problems. The theory also provided law enforcement
with the ability to develop strategies to address these problems,
whether through traditional law enforcement mechanisms or by
working with other government agencies.
The concept of community policing is sometimes difficult to
define. In fact, the Committee to Review Research on Police
Policy and Practices of the National Research Council (National
Research Council, 2004) concluded that community policing is
simply too amorphous a concept to submit to empirical evalu-
ation. Xu, Fiedler, and Flaming (2005), however, may have
solved this problem. They argue that the purpose of community
policing is to expand the police role to include responsibility for
the elimination of the social conditions that cause crime. While
the professional model viewed police as law enforcement agents,
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community policing argues that the police should look beyond
the law enforcement model to identify the conditions that gen-
erate crime and identify solutions to eradicate it. This new way
of thinking is intended to look at crime in a more holistic view.
For community policing, fighting crime is not an end in itself,
but a means to the goal of eliminating the problems that cause
crime. Effective policing should not only apprehend criminals,
but also eliminate the social conditions that breed crime. By
eliminating the conditions that cause crime, police can prevent
future crime, thus reducing the total number of criminals in
society: something that the traditional incident-oriented approach
cannot do.
The idea that the police can address the ‘root causes’ of
crime is a lot to expect from a government agency that is not
equipped to carry out society-wide public policy reforms. Can
the police realistically be expected to eliminate poverty and
improve access to education as a means to control crime?
Probably not, but in the words of Xu, Fiedler, and Flaming
(2005) they can (and have been expected to) participate in crime
prevention through socialisation and social learning. That is,
through community policing, they can be expected to increase
positive stimuli and normative reinforcement, especially in the
lives of young people, by interfacing with people on a regular
basis, promoting community norms, providing moral guidance,
and reinforcing socially acceptable behaviours through activities
jointly sponsored by the police and the community. Although
police have engaged in these activities for years, it is only
recently that they have become the subject of theoretical analysis
by the academic community.
Theoretical Explanations
American criminology rests squarely on social structural expla-
nations of crime and the impact that a community has on
regulating the conduct of its members. Community policing asks
citizens to assume responsibility for crime by reporting crimes
promptly to the police and by cooperating as witnesses when
crimes occur. In order to ensure citizen cooperation, police have
attempted to take responsibility for mobilising individuals and
organisations around crime prevention through various com-
munity police programmes, including community meetings that
seek to increase favourable contacts between the police and the
public. Sociologists envision that these efforts will help to
increase the informal social control mechanisms inherent in
communities that have been lost in neighbourhoods besieged by
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crime and disorder, thus enabling residents to contribute to
maintaining social control.
Two theoretical constructs underlie most community polic-
ing programmes: ‘broken windows’ theory and the ‘community
implant’ hypothesis. Both are grounded in social disorganisation
theory and both argue that there is a direct relationship between
distressed communities and crime. Defined by Thomas and
Znaniecki (1980) as a decrease in the influence of existing rules
of behaviour upon individual members of a group, social dis-
organisation argues that there is a direct relationship between
higher rates of deviance and the increased complexities of urban
life. Shaw and McKay (1942) used the work of Thomas and
Znaniecki to formulate a structural theory of crime. Supported by
30 years of research in Chicago, they argue that poor neighbour-
hoods, inhabited by heterogeneous and residentially unstable
groups, are more likely to lack social organisation and, as a
result, experience higher rates of juvenile delinquency. Although
Shaw and McKay’s theory was formulated more than fifty years
ago, during a time of massive immigration to Chicago and other
American cities, their findings are still relevant today. William
Julius Wilson (1987), also studying the city of Chicago, argues
that the de-industrialisation of American society has led to the
establishment of a new set of structural constraints that has
continued to fuel social disorganisation. Communities suffering
from increased unemployment, poor educational opportunities,
and residential immobility also lack the social organisation
needed to control delinquent and criminal behaviour.
In her influential book, The Social Sources of Delinquency,
Kornhauser (1978) redefined social disorganisation as the inabil-
ity of a community social structure to realise the common values
of its members and to maintain effective social controls. Com-
munity policing advocates such as Rosenbaum (1987) argue that
if crime is the result of social disorganisation, police departments
should work to improve social control by strengthening com-
munity ties and by encouraging behaviours that provide a basis
for regulating conduct; in essence, work with communities to
help them regulate the conduct of their members. A common
methodology used by police agencies to improve social control
in community areas is order-maintenance policing based on what
has come to be known as broken windows theory.
Broken Windows Theory
Broken windows theory is a direct outgrowth of the Newark,
New Jersey, Foot Patrol Experiment, in which foot patrol was
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reintroduced into community areas in an effort to reduce crime
(Kelling, 1981). Although foot patrol did not have a direct effect
on crime, citizens felt safer and developed a more favourable
opinion of the police. In addition, the officers themselves
expressed greater satisfaction with their work. How was this so?
Citizens felt safer because fear of crime was reduced, that is fear
of being bothered by disorderly people: drunks, panhandlers,
addicts, prostitutes, gangs, and rowdy teens. It has been argued
that the movement towards professionalism had downgraded
order maintenance as a police concern and concentrated law
enforcement activities on more serious violations (Kelling &
Moore, 1988). In addition, foot patrol had come to be viewed as
an unproductive use of police manpower. The New Jersey
experience provided a new justification for a return to foot patrol
as a legitimate use of police resources and highlighted the
importance of fear reduction strategies as well.
Broken windows theory is based on the assumption that
disorder and crime are linked in a developmental sequence. If a
window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, so the
argument goes, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken
as well. The unrepaired window is a signal that no one cares and
so breaking more windows will not result in official sanction.
This type of vandalism can occur anywhere once the sense of
mutual regard and the obligations of civility are lowered by
actions that seem to signal a lack of common concern. Broken
windows theory was introduced in an Atlantic Monthly article by
Wilson and Kelling in 1982 and has since become a driving
force in community policing programmes, because of the belief
that untended behaviour leads to the breakdown of community
controls and crime. Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that neigh-
bourhoods where property is abandoned, weeds grow, windows
are broken, and adults stop scolding rowdy children cause
families to move out and unattached adults to move in. Fights
occur, litter accumulates, people drink on the public way, and
panhandlers begin to approach pedestrians. Graffiti proliferates,
suggesting that the area is uncontrollable, and the fear of crime
increases. In response, people begin to use the streets less,
causing the area to become vulnerable to criminal invasion. The
withdrawal of the community leads to increased drug sales,
prostitution, and mugging.
The broken windows hypothesis was tested by Skogan
(1990) in his book Disorder and Decline. Collecting data from
40 urban neighbourhoods, Skogan concluded that disorder
increases the level of serious crime. He identified two types
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of disorder: physical disorder, which includes the presence of
junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, vandalism,
graffiti, and stripped and abandoned cars; and social disorder,
which includes the presence of gangs, prostitutes, panhandlers,
drunks, and open gambling and drug use. Skogan also presented
evidence that disorder needed to be distinguished from serious
crime, further strengthening the call for order maintenance
policing. His work also supported social disorganisation theory.
Skogan’s findings established that poverty, instability, and the
racial composition of a neighbourhood were strongly linked to
area crime, but a substantial portion of that linkage was through
disorder.
Kelling and Coles (1996) provided further support for broken
windows theory in their book Fixing Broken Windows. In it, they
argue that the police needed to pay more serious attention to
disorder and order maintenance policing. Arguing that the law
enforcement model had fixed police resources on felony crime,
the authors conclude that order maintenance issues had reached a
critical mass, causing fear of crime to increase. Although con-
sistent with the ideology that non-violent deviance should be
tolerated in the interest of liberty, the decriminalisation of
alcoholism, increased numbers of homeless people, and the de-
institutionalisation of the mentally ill all increased disorder and
fear of crime in neighbourhood areas. Kelling and Coles offered
the dramatic decrease in crime in New York City as evidence of
the importance of order maintenance policing. Through strict
enforcement of incivilities and misdemeanour offences, New
York, he argued, solved much of its crime problem. So sub-
stantial was the decrease in crime that Silverman (1999) reported
that the decrease in New York City alone accounted for 60% of
the national decline in crime.
There have been a number of challenges to what has been
described as the ‘New York Miracle’ and to broken windows
theory itself. In fact, Harcourt (1998) wrote in the Michigan Law
Review that there was no empirical evidence to support the
theory. His position was later expanded in his 2001 book entitled
The Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows. In
1993, New York City began the ‘quality of life initiative’, an
order maintenance strategy targeting minor misdemeanour
offenders premised on the broken windows concept. The prin-
cipal scientific justification for the initiative was the nexus
between disorder and crime established by Skogan’s book Dis-
order and Decline. By eliminating minor misdemeanours and
disorderly behaviour, New York thought that it could deter
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serious crime. Harcourt defined this thesis as the ‘social influ-
ence’ conception of deterrence. As mentioned earlier, New York
offered its falling crime rate as evidence that broken windows
policing was working. Harcourt, however, challenged this posi-
tion by arguing that there were other factors that contributed to
the falling crime rate, including an increase of 3,000 police
officers, favourable economic conditions, a reduction in the
18–24-year-old population, an increased number of persons
imprisoned, and the fact that the crime rate was decreasing all
over the country, and not just in New York City. Harcourt titled
his explanation for the decreasing New York crime rate
‘enhanced surveillance’. Enhanced surveillance, in the form of
increased law enforcement, provided a reason for investigating
persons suspected of committing crimes. Harcourt argued that it
was not by a reduction in litter, fixing broken windows, or
eliminating graffiti that crime decreased, but the result of
increased law enforcement efforts on the part of the police.
Harcourt (1998) also challenged the methodological integrity
of Skogan’s original analysis. In replicating Skogan’s study,
Harcourt found that 30%–40% of the data were missing and that
five of the sample neighbourhoods had excessively influenced
the occurrence of robbery. Once these areas were controlled for,
the relationship between robbery and disorder disappeared.
These findings led Harcourt to conclude that the data did not
support the claim that reducing disorder deters serious crime. In
the end, Harcourt concluded that order maintenance policing did
not uphold community values, but created community norms
defining disorderly activities as criminal offences, activities that
could be better handled by social service agencies.
Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) conducted research that
provided what many believed was empirical support for
Harcourt’s position. Combining census data, police records,
3,500 resident surveys, and videotapes of more than 23,000
street segments in Chicago, the authors found that, contrary to
broken windows theory, the relationship between public disorder
and crime was spurious. Graffiti does not cause crime! Disorder
and crime are both manifestations of the same explanatory
process. They share common structural and social origins. The
cause of crime is structural disadvantage and weak collective
efficacy: the ability of a community to regulate conduct. The
authors add that the fascination in public policy circles with
cleaning up disorder through law enforcement techniques is
simplistic and misplaced in terms of directly fighting crime. In
fact, their data demonstrate that crime and disorder are not
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highly correlated and that neighbourhoods high in disorder do
not have higher crime rates than neighbourhoods low in disorder.
The authors, however, do not totally discount the usefulness of
disorder in predicting crime. Rather than arguing that disorder is
the direct cause of crime, the authors argue that disorder is part
and parcel of crime itself. Social disorder and incivilities are
evidence that crime is occurring. Therefore, public disorder
crimes and predatory crimes are manifestations of the same
explanatory process, although at different ends of the seriousness
scale. Because disorder is a manifestation of crime-relevant
mechanisms, Sampson and Raudenbush argue that improved
collective efficacy should reduce disorder and violence by dis-
empowering the forces that produce both.
Further support for the attack on broken windows theory
came from a book published by Taylor (2001) entitled Breaking
away from Broken Windows. The object of Taylor’s work was to
determine the origin of incivilities and determine whether or not
they eroded urban life over time. Taylor found that there were
two types of reactions to crime: fear as a psychological concept
and fear as an ecological concept. Fear as a psychological
concept is a reflection of an individual’s perception of crime.
Analysing data collected in Baltimore, Maryland, Taylor con-
cluded that fear, as a psychological concept, overshadows fear as
an ecological concept. Some people are more fearful than others.
Therefore, zero-tolerance, order-maintenance police strategies,
aimed at reducing fear of crime, may be misdirected and should
not be adopted axiomatically. Incivilities are better interpreted as
a result of an economically disadvantaged neighbourhood, rather
than as a symptom of a disorderly or disorganised neighbour-
hood, and that crime fighting is more important than grime
fighting for long-term reductions in crime.
Broken windows policing was also challenged by declining
crimes rates in San Francisco. A study conducted by the
California-based Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (2002)
demonstrated that during the time that New York City was being
held up as a national model, similar rates of decline were
occurring in other cities around the country, the most notable of
which was San Francisco. Long derided by conservatives for its
alternative crime policies, San Francisco registered reductions in
crime that equalled or exceeded comparable cities and jurisdic-
tions, including New York City, in spite of having adopted less
strident law enforcement policies that reduced arrests, prosecu-
tions, and incarceration rates. In fact, San Francisco’s crime
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reduction coincided with declining misdemeanour and felony
arrest rates and declining prison commitments.
The backlash against broken windows policing is not shared
by all criminologists. Thacher (2004) argues that this backlash
focuses too narrowly on broken windows theory in its assess-
ment of order maintenance policing’s effect on serious crime,
and that some forms of order maintenance policing are intrins-
ically valuable. Even if we cannot establish a direct causal
relationship between crime and disorder, Thacher believes that
order maintenance policing may create desirable outcomes, but
we have not identified these outcomes because of a lack of
ethnographic research and qualitative study. He also cautions
against the dangers of ‘strong causal reasoning’ policy analyses
that rely on claims that an intervention will have large, indirect
effects on some important social problem, when only a small
amount of variation in the dependent variable is explained.
The caution against strong causal reasoning works both
ways. There have been a growing number of studies that reject
the attacks against broken windows theory and provide evidence
of the direct effects of order maintenance policing on crime
(Corman & Mocan, 2002; Worrall, 2002; Xu et al., 2005). These
studies, however, could also be criticised for their reliance on
complex causal models whose ability to predict variation in the
dependent variable is limited. Xu, Fiedler, and Flaming (2005)
provide the best example. They not only develop a causal model
that supports broken windows policing, but also caution the
reader about their findings. For example, the authors conclude
that their study has its limitations because: they were unable to
distinguish between individual-level effects and community-
level effects; they did not have adequate access to community
policing variables, and the external validity of their study had its
limitations. These comments are not meant to be a criticism of
their work, but to show the complex nature of the topic under
study. In fact, their study provides one of the most robust
reviews of broken windows policing available.
The legitimatisation of order maintenance policing has
brought community policing full circle. The reform era of
policing established police as professional law enforcers and
crime fighters. This professional model led to the establishment
of aggressive patrol strategies, which often placed police in
direct confrontation with minority communities. Community
policing sought to remedy these problems and re-establish com-
munication between the police and the public. Broken windows
policing, however, has broadened aggressive patrol strategies by
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extending them to include ordinance and misdemeanour
offences; an ironic outcome for a programme that was created to
improve police–community relations.
In the end, it must be concluded that empirical support for
broken windows theory and order maintenance policing, in spite
of their popularity, is mixed. In fact, sceptics like Harcourt
(1998), have gone as far as to say that: ‘Broken windows
policing is a harmful, conservative philosophy masquerading as
pragmatic and progressive public policy.’ In response to critics,
Bratton and Kelling (2006) argue that there was nothing in the
original broken windows article about zero-tolerance policing,
and that the essence of the police role in maintaining order is to
reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community
itself by collaborating with citizens and the better training of
police officers in the use of discretion. Such an approach is the
basis of the community implant hypothesis.
Community Implant Hypothesis
The second major theoretical construct underlying community
policing programmes is the community implant hypothesis.
Sociologists have long argued that one of the main reasons for
high levels of crime is the lack of informal social control in
community areas. The community implant hypothesis argues that
informal social control can be implanted by collective citizen
action in neighbourhoods where social control is naturally weak
or non-existent. The term community implant hypothesis was
first used by Rosenbaum (1987) in his essay entitled ‘Theory
and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch’. This approach has
also been described as ‘community building’ by Mastrofski,
Worden, and Snipes (1995). Community building is a process by
which the police strengthen the capacity and resolve of citizens
to resist crime by building positive relationships with community
residents.
Social control generally refers to the capacity of a group to
regulate its members. It involves the use of rewards and punish-
ments to ensure that members of a society obey group norms.
Formal social control is derived from written rules and laws and
is enforced by the police and the courts. Informal social control
is based on custom and social norms and is enforced by the
citizenry through behaviours such as surveillance, verbal repri-
mand, rejection, warning, and other pressures to encourage
conformity. The question for community policing then becomes
whether the police, working with the community, can implement
informal social control in socially disorganised community areas.
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This strategy has in fact been adopted by a number of police
departments as the basis of their community policing pro-
grammes in the form of beat meetings and greater community
involvement in problem-solving activities, and is the basis of the
community policing argument that citizens are co-producers of
public safety.
Lyons (1999), in his book The Politics of Community Polic-
ing, argues that a core assumption in the logic of community
policing is that innovative police strategies can mobilise the
informal mechanisms of social control embedded within com-
munity life. This vision, inspired by the Newark foot patrol ex-
periment, calls for a return to the days when foot patrol officers
knew residents by name and, because of the relationships thus
established by these officers, citizens would provide information
to assist the police in establishing neighbourhood order: a return
to ‘Mayberry’ (idyllic small-town life) where the familiarity of
community life contributed to the establishment of social order.
It should be noted, however, that not everyone agrees that there
is an earlier time in policing worth returning to. Walker (1984)
argues that the good old days of the friendly cop on the beat
never existed, and that police departments during the political era
were replete with corruption and evasion of duty.
In spite of the popularity of programmes that utilise the
community-building approach, there is little empirical research
to support the effectiveness of the community implant hypo-
thesis. Although not aimed directly at testing this approach, two
important evaluations cast doubt on the ability of community and
government efforts to increase social control at the community
level and, much less, have a direct impact on crime and delin-
quency. The first, the Chicago Area Project begun in the 1930s
by Clifford Shaw, was developed to prevent juvenile delin-
quency by enhancing social control in community areas through
the use of educational, recreational, and occupational opportun-
ities for youth. In spite of its many individual successes, an
evaluation of the initiative conducted by Finestone (1972) con-
cluded that the project had not provided a method of coping with
the most serious forms of delinquency in the areas of the city
with the highest rates of criminality, which suggested that efforts
at creating informal social control were ineffective.
The ability of community residents and government officials
to increase social control in neighbourhoods was also tested by
Skogan (1990), who argued that efforts at increasing the effec-
tiveness of the local community to address crime and disorder
have taken two approaches: identifying existing community
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organisations and encouraging them to make a greater commit-
ment to the prevention of disorder and crime; and encouraging
the formation of organisations in communities where viable
opportunities for participation in anticrime activities do not
appear to exist. Skogan tested both models. Four existing com-
munity programmes were studied in Chicago, and several new
programmes were evaluated in Minneapolis. The evaluations
were designed to test whether: (1) the programmes increased
social interaction and mutual solidarity; (2) enhanced people’s
feelings of efficacy about individual and collective community
action; (3) stimulated the residents’ willingness to intervene in
suspicious circumstances; and (4) whether the programmes
encouraged the residents to take positive steps to prevent dis-
order and crime.
No programme was found to increase solidarity or social
interaction. Nor did any of the programmes improve neighbour-
hood conditions. In Minneapolis, after two years of effort,
residents of the programme areas did  not see any improvement
in measures of perceived disorder, physical decay, crime, or fear
of crime, in spite of the fact that professional organisers were
hired to mobilise their neighbourhoods around crime control
issues. These findings raised important questions about the
ability of community-organising efforts to affect the quality of
life in neighbourhood areas. Skogan concluded by asking
whether the programmes had failed or whether theory had
failed.
The concern with theory failure may have been remedied by
the introduction of the concept of satisfaction with the police.
Research by Silver and Miller (2004), in the social disorganisa-
tion tradition utilising data collected by the Project on Human
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, found that community
attachment and satisfaction with the police contribute signifi-
cantly to neighbourhood levels of informal social control. The
residents of communities that were satisfied with the ability of
the police to control crime and maintain order were more likely
to engage in activities to control youthful behaviour.
Increased satisfaction with the police is indeed one of the
fundamental goals of community policing. If residents feel a
greater sense of responsibility for maintaining order when they
are satisfied with the police, police should work to create better
relationships with the community. Based on the work of Silver
and Miller (2004), it could be argued that efforts to ‘implant’
informal social control in urban neighbourhoods, where social
control is naturally weak or non-existent, can be positively
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affected by improved police–community relations. Interestingly,
Silver and Miller (2004) also offer a way to reconcile the debate
over broken windows theory. Their research indicates that satis-
faction with the police is strongly related to perceptions of social
order including litter, graffiti, and public drinking. Residents of
neighbourhoods characterised by visible signs of disorder hold
police accountable for these conditions. Therefore, a promising
strategy may be one that persuades residents that the police are
willing to work with them to address these problems.
What Does it All Mean?
Research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (2002)
found that the biggest factor contributing to satisfaction with the
police was the public’s perceptions about the quality of their
lives: their sense of safety. The second biggest factor in shaping
opinions was direct contact with the officers: how police behave
when they interact with citizens. These findings have two
important implications. First, if citizens fear for their safety,
broken windows policing can be an important strategy for
reducing the signs of physical and social disorder that lead to
increased levels of anxiety. Second, improving the quality of
daily interaction between patrol officers and citizens may be the
best possible way for a police department to improve public
satisfaction with the police. Both of these findings are closely
related. Rose and Clear (1998) found that police use of heavy-
handed tactics can deplete already deficient relational networks.
Therefore, aggressive order maintenance tactics, characteristic of
zero-tolerance policing programmes, may work against satisfac-
tion with the police, whether or not these programmes are
successful at bringing order to the environment.
Research conducted by Resig and Parks (2000) found that
much of the neighbourhood variation in satisfaction with the
police can be explained by concentrated disadvantage. That is,
there were fewer healthy, collaborative relationships between the
police and neighbourhood residents in disadvantaged commun-
ities. This finding led them to question whether community
policing could help the truly disadvantaged. In a separate study,
Resig and Parks (2004), utilising data collected for the 1996
Project on Policing Neighborhoods, found that communities
where citizens and their police have formed collaborative
partnerships report fewer incivility problems and feel safer
independently of structural disadvantage and crime, and that
police–community collaboration partially mediates the influence
of concentrated disadvantage on neighbourhood quality of life.
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Community policing therefore can help residents of poor, crime-
infested neighbourhoods.
Where does all this leave the community implant hypothesis?
The original vision of returning to the days of the cop on the beat
has never materialised. What has materialised, at least in one
Chicago neighbourhood, is a new form of social organisation,
one that Carr (2003) describes as the ‘new parochialism’. For
Carr, the practices of social control are increasingly less likely to
be either formal or informal in their pure form. Rather, manifes-
tations of social control tend to rely upon an intersection between
formal and informal providers of social control. In a qualitative
study of Chicago’s Southwest Side, Carr found that collective
supervision of neighbourhood youth, a core concept of informal
social control, was sporadic at best. Supervision and intervention
in disputes was age-graded and confined, for the most part, to
familial and personal networks. Parents were too busy working
to supervise their children, and neighbours were afraid or unwill-
ing to fill the void. The practices of informal social control in
‘Beltway’, as he called the neighbourhood, were organised
mainly around Chicago’s community police programme, the
Chicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS). CAPS provided
neighbourhood residents with ties to local politicians, the police,
the judiciary, and the city bureaucracy, strengthening the capa-
city of the community to defend its local interests. Rather than
intercede directly in neighbourhood disputes, residents brought
their complaints to CAPS meetings, where the police and other
city agencies were recruited to solve community problems.
Given the nature of today’s society in which both parents
work, some holding two jobs, it is only logical to expect a
decrease in informal social control in community areas. Addi-
tionally, people no longer tend to live in extended family groups.
Brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, and nieces and nephews
no longer live in the same town, let alone on the same block.
And people no longer work in the same neighbourhood where
they live. Nor do all children attend neighbourhood schools
thanks to desegregation, access to excellence programmes, and
the desire to attend private schools. All of which have had a
dramatic impact on routine activities, which directly affects
informal social control at the neighbourhood level. What appears
to have replaced these associational ties as a form of social
control, at least in Chicago’s Beltway neighbourhood, is com-
munity policing. Community policing allowed neighbourhood
residents to address problems of disorder and crime by securing
ties to public officials and the police. Velez (2001) had similar
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findings. Analysing data from the 1977 Police Services Survey
(Ostrum et al., 1977), Velez found that a neighbourhood’s ability
to secure external resources was directly correlated with crime
and victimisation.
Studies relating satisfaction with the police to increased
social control, and the idea that a new parochialism is emerging
in community areas, should be good news for community
policing advocates. Both validate the importance of community
policing programmes for law enforcement effectiveness. Surpris-
ingly, however, police seem to be moving in a new direction.
Community policing is evolving. The influence of broken
windows policing has overwhelmed the community implant
hypothesis. In fact, it appears that technological innovations are
pushing police into a totally new law enforcement paradigm
based, in part, upon the computer-generated analysis of crime.
Integrated problem solving, strategy development, and intense
managerial oversight, as evidenced by New York’s Compstat
programme, appear to be the basis of a new model of policing
focusing on crime and disorder. Compstat is a strategic man-
agement process that uses computer-generated data, flexible
operational strategies, and supervisory accountability to manage
the occurrence of crime and disorder. Walsh (2001) identified
four principles that form the basis of the Compstat programme:
(1) accurate and timely information about crime; (2) rapid and
focused deployment of personnel; (3) effective managerial tac-
tics; and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment.
The Compstat model has been adopted by a number of police
departments, including Detroit, Philadelphia, and Chicago. In
Chicago it is known as ‘DOC,’ short for Deployment Operations
Center. DOC places computer-generated crime information in
the hands of managers so that they can make strategic deploy-
ment decisions based on where violent crime is taking place. A
100-officer task force, known as the Targeted Response Unit,
comprising specially selected and highly motivated officers, is
deployed to specific locations throughout the city based on the
intelligence information generated by a daily DOC analysis. In
2005, the Chicago Police Department attributed a 7.1% decrease
in crime to the introduction of this new technology in con-
junction with increased camera surveillance and community
feedback (Chicago Police Department, 2005).
This new police paradigm has come to be known as
intelligence-led policing (ILP). ILP is the collection of informa-
tion to produce an intelligence-based end-product designed to
inform police decision makers at both the tactical and strategic
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levels. It is a model of policing in which intelligence about crime
serves as a guide to operations. ILP has been described as a
new dimension of community policing in that both rely on
information management, two-way communication with the
public, scientific data analysis, and problem solving (Carter,
2004). It is built on the argument that the trusting relationships
developed between patrol officers and the community can be
used to gather information about crime. It is envisioned that the
information collected by community police officers will not only
concern crime and disorder, but also criminal enterprises and
terrorism. In fact, much of the interest in intelligence-led
policing has been generated by both the FBI and the Department
of Homeland Security as part of their antiterrorist campaigns.
What this really means is that community police officers will
be encouraged to develop informants in immigrant commun-
ities, especially Islamic–American communities, in order to
further what has been described as ‘terrorist-oriented policing’
(Kerlikowske, 2004).
The focus of community policing on crime control and order
maintenance is not surprising. Soft policing is hard! Given the
choice of computer-driven law enforcement or community build-
ing, it is no wonder that police have chosen the more familiar
path of crime fighting, even if it involves increasingly criminalis-
ing minor offences. Asking law enforcement officers to control
crime by building stronger informal relationships with the people
in the communities they serve has been a difficult concept for the
police to grasp. In fact, putting officers in direct contact with
citizens in the hope of fashioning solutions to community
problems runs contrary to the professional model and recent
police culture. In addition, the idea at the core of community
policing of returning to foot patrol and the cop on the beat cannot
be accomplished without expending extraordinary resources. In
essence, we would need two police departments: the first consist-
ing of a series of neighbourhood foot patrols overlapped by a
second group of motorised officers to respond to calls for
service. The mission of the first would be informal social control,
while the second would engage in traditional police practices.
Such a system exists in Japan. Probably the most successful
example of informal social control on the part of police is the
Japanese Koban system described by Bayley (1991) in his book,
Forces of Order. The Koban or ‘police box’ is simply a police
substation. There are approximately 1,000 Kobans in metro-
politan Tokyo. Japanese police are addressed by the public as
‘Omawari-san’ (Mr Walkabout), and that is just what many of
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them do. What the foot officer does is demonstrate the existence
of authority, correct minor problems, and generate trust through
the establishment of familiar personal relations with neighbour-
hood inhabitants. The importance of the Koban system for
community policing is that it makes the police familiar in
neighbourhoods and thereby increases their approachability. It
offsets psychological distance, thereby reducing anxiety, by
creating a setting which is intimate, permanent, and small in
scale.
The Koban itself not only acts as an outpost where police
reports can be made, but also as a community service centre
providing police assistance in any number of government-related
activities; much like the system of community policing advo-
cated in the United States. The Koban system, however, is not all
public relations. Koban officers patrol their neighbourhoods on
foot and respond to radio calls as well. They look for people who
appear out of place or furtive. They give special attention to
loitering males, look for runaway adolescents, and watch for
loitering prostitutes. Forty per cent of the criminals wanted by
the police in Japan are discovered by patrolmen on the street
during the course of their routine foot patrols. This activity is
very important to the Japanese police, who have regional and
national contests each year to give recognition to the officers
who are best at it. The Koban system is not restricted to urban
areas, but extends throughout the countryside where police
substations are referred to as chuzaisho. To paraphrase Bayley,
American police are equivalent to firemen who respond to
emergencies; while in Japan, police are like postmen who make
daily rounds of low-key activities that relate to the lives of the
people in the community.
Would it be asking too much if we sought to realign our
policing efforts to mirror the Japanese method? There would
certainly be an increased monetary cost. Critics of such a
suggestion would undoubtedly point to the differences between
Japanese and American society. In particular, they would argue
that Japan is a homogeneous society, while America is multi-
cultural. Also, Japan simply does not have the same types of
crime problems that exist in the United States. Additionally,
American society is built around the use of the automobile and
low-density communities are the norm. Would it make any sense
to have foot officers patrolling communities where they were
unlikely to encounter citizens? Should foot patrol be restricted to
high-population-density areas? Although the Newark and other
foot patrol studies indicate that foot patrol is an effective police
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strategy, there has never been a long-term analysis of foot
patrol’s ability to implant informal social control in an American
community.
Conclusion
In the end, it appears that everyone involved in the community
policing debate is correct. Social scientists may be correct when
they argue that broken windows do not cause crime, but broken
windows do cause fear, making order maintenance policing a
legitimate pursuit for law enforcement. What is important is the
manner in which police conduct their order maintenance activ-
ities. Police have been known to be ‘dirty workers’ (Hughes,
1962) doing ‘what they have to do’ in order to get the job done
through the use (or misuse) of discretion. Research has high-
lighted the importance of satisfaction with the police. No one
likes to be the subject of an illegal police interrogation or search.
For police to be successful at order maintenance policing they
must simply work within the law. In many ways, order main-
tenance policing is nothing more than an extension of the
professional model. Increasing the number of ordinance violation
and misdemeanour arrests is, without any doubt, a bureaucratic
practice. We did not need a paradigm shift to accomplish these
goals. Nor did we need a paradigm shift to implement the
enhanced public relations efforts that are characteristic of com-
munity policing programmes. We did, however, need a paradigm
shift to recognise the importance of informal social control to
police operations.
Working with communities to strengthen their capacity to
control aberrant conduct is a new challenge for law enforcement.
In fact, such efforts run contrary to the traditional law enforce-
ment model that sought to distance police from the community in
order to create impartiality and prevent corruption. As a result,
police have encountered some difficulty in their efforts to
implement community policing and have been reluctant to
provide the resources necessary to establish the networks of foot
patrol officers originally envisioned by community policing
advocates. As a result, the jury is still out on the community
implant hypothesis as originally envisioned. The good news
is that Carr’s new parochialism may hold the key to the
operationalisation of the community implant hypothesis and
the realisation of the promise of community policing.
Finally, an often-quoted article in the FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin concludes that we should put to bed the era of com-
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munity policing and engage, instead, in policing utilising the best
of what we have learned in the last 20 years (Kerlikowske,
2004). As former police officers, we do not agree. (Yes, both
authors were police officers.) Just like so many other officers, we
were initially sceptical of community policing, but the record
is clear. Community policing holds great promise! What is not
clear, however, is how community policing can strengthen
informal social control.
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